Marcos’ Bold Nuclear Bet Raises Stakes

When a sitting president repeatedly ties nuclear power to high electricity prices and a declared “national energy emergency,” the story is no longer about abstract technology—it is about whether the Philippines is finally building the institutional backbone for a nuclear phase of its energy future.

At a Glance

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has made revisiting nuclear energy a central, recurring theme of his energy policy, from his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) through his fifth.
A new law, Republic Act No. 12305, creates PhilAtom, an independent nuclear regulatory authority with “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over the peaceful, safe, and secure use of nuclear energy.
The administration has updated its nuclear roadmap and set an indicative target of first nuclear power by around 2032, linking the move explicitly to lowering power costs and reinforcing energy security.
Manila is pursuing multiple international partnerships and feasibility studies, including with South Korea on reviving the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant and with the United States on training and framework development.
Despite this institutional momentum, there is still no operating nuclear power plant in the Philippines; promises of cheaper electricity and greater security remain projections, not yet empirical results.

Marcos’ Nuclear Push: From Political Signal to Policy Program

President Marcos did not stumble into nuclear energy as a passing idea; he has treated it as a structural answer to the country’s longstanding problems of high power prices and unreliable supply. In his first SONA in July 2022, he declared that “the time is ripe” to reexamine the state’s policy on nuclear energy and explicitly called for revisiting the strategy toward building nuclear power plants. He anchored that appeal in modern safety advances and compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations, presenting nuclear not as a risky gamble but as a mature technology governed by strengthened global safeguards after Fukushima.

Four years later, in his fifth SONA, that theme returned with sharper language. Facing what he has formally described as a national energy emergency, Marcos told Congress that “perhaps it is time for us to revisit nuclear energy production,” linking it directly to two concrete goals: reinforcing energy security and bringing down the cost of electricity. The repetition matters. In energy politics, a single speech can be rhetorical; a sustained series of addresses, combined with legislative and regulatory action, signals a strategic program.

Building the Nuclear Regulator: PhilAtom and the Legal Framework

The most decisive institutional move so far is the creation of the Philippine Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority, or PhilAtom. With the signing of Republic Act No. 12305—the Philippine National Nuclear Energy Safety Act—Marcos placed nuclear safety, security, and safeguards on a dedicated legal and bureaucratic footing. The law defines PhilAtom as an independent, quasi-judicial body with “sole and exclusive jurisdiction” over the peaceful, safe, and secure uses of nuclear energy and radiation sources in the country, including radioactive waste and spent fuel.

Substantively, this legislation moves the Philippines closer to the standard model seen in nuclear states: a separation between promoters of nuclear energy and a regulator empowered to say no. PhilAtom is mandated to establish systems for accounting and control of nuclear materials, regulate all nuclear and radiation activities, and serve as the national point of contact for nuclear and radiological emergencies, in line with IAEA norms. The law codifies prohibited acts—from unauthorized operation of nuclear facilities to improper handling of radioactive materials—with penalties ranging up to imprisonment and multimillion-peso fines, embedding nuclear activities in a clearly articulated compliance and enforcement regime.

Nuclear as “Strategic Pillar” of Energy Security and Industrial Growth

Marcos’ rhetoric around nuclear energy has evolved from exploration to affirmation. In public remarks to the Philippine International Nuclear Supply Chain Forum, he described nuclear power as a “strategic pillar” of the country’s energy future and an attractive option for long-term planning and institutional continuity. That choice of language is important: it positions nuclear not just as one generation source among many, but as a backbone for industrial development, baseload reliability, and broader science-driven modernization.

Government and industry reporting now references a formal framework that names the first “Pioneer Nuclear Power Plant” as a priority baseload facility with guaranteed grid access, exempt from some competitive bidding rules applied to other projects. Projections from that framework envision the Philippines generating its first nuclear kilowatt-hour by about 2032, with nuclear capacity rising to approximately 2,600 megawatts by 2035 and 4,800 megawatts by mid-century. In policy terms, this embeds nuclear energy as a long-horizon anchor in the country’s integrated resource planning, rather than a peripheral experiment.

Roadmaps, Feasibility Studies, and the Bataan Question

The Marcos administration has paired its rhetorical commitment with procedural steps: updating the nuclear energy roadmap, commissioning feasibility work, and exploring site options. Officials have said the Philippines is “set to update its nuclear energy roadmap,” explicitly tying that update to the goal of lowering power rates and securing a steady source of energy. Under the broader Philippine Energy Plan, Manila has outlined nuclear generation targets that match the 2032 timeline now referenced in public documents.

The most symbolically charged piece of this puzzle is the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), a 1970s-era project never brought online and long portrayed as a relic of cost, controversy, and wasted potential. Marcos has expressed interest in reviving BNPP, and his government signed an agreement with South Korea’s Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) to conduct a feasibility study on rehabilitating the plant. The Department of Energy has emphasized that KHNP will shoulder the study’s cost and that the Philippines is not obliged to proceed, underscoring that the project is in an evaluation phase rather than a pre-committed revival.

That distinction is crucial. BNPP’s history—mothballed for decades amid safety concerns, legal disputes, and shifting politics—has created a durable narrative of nuclear as a promise perpetually deferred. A thorough feasibility study could clarify whether BNPP can be economically and safely salvaged or whether new-build options, such as small modular reactors (SMRs), offer better value. But until such engineering and financial assessments are public, Bataan remains more symbol than solution.

Pangulong Ferdinand Marcos Jr.: “It is time for us to revisit nuclear energy production.” #SONA2026

— Ang Pahayagang Plaridel (@Plaridel_DLSU) July 27, 2026

International Partnerships and Technology Choices

Marcos has sought to internationalize the nuclear effort, courting partners across a broad geopolitical spectrum. The Philippines announced a deal with the United States in 2024 to train Filipino personnel on how to build and operate nuclear power plants, a necessary step for developing domestic human capital in reactor operation and regulation. Manila has also explored cooperation with the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation in the UAE, invoked potential collaboration with Russia, and engaged with suppliers promoting SMR technology.

This multi-vector outreach reflects both opportunity and risk. On the one hand, diverse partnerships can expand access to financing, technology, and training, strengthening the program’s resilience. On the other, courting vendors from South Korea, the U.S., Russia, and the UAE exposes the nuclear agenda to geopolitical scrutiny and criticism that the program is being shaped by foreign commercial and strategic interests. For a country where energy policy has often intersected with questions of sovereignty and corruption, transparent procurement and clearly articulated vendor-selection criteria will matter as much as technical specifications.

Promises and Uncertainties: Prices, Safety, and SMRs

Throughout his nuclear advocacy, Marcos has insisted that nuclear power can help “bring down the cost of electricity” and “reinforce our energy security.” Those claims are plausible in principle: nuclear plants provide large-scale, low-carbon baseload generation and can buffer volatile fossil-fuel prices. Yet the evidence base in the Philippine context remains prospective. No operating nuclear plant exists in the country, and there is no completed domestic cost-benefit analysis publicly demonstrating that nuclear will be cheaper, on a levelized basis, than combinations of renewables, gas, storage, and grid upgrades.

Safety assurances are similarly procedural rather than empirical at this stage. The creation of PhilAtom, the emphasis on IAEA compliance, and references to post-Fukushima regulatory strengthening show that the administration understands the reputational stakes. However, safety in practice will depend on site-specific assessments—seismic risk, flood and climate resilience, emergency response capacity—and on a national strategy for managing spent fuel and radioactive waste. Those elements are not yet fully articulated in public documents.

Technology choice adds another layer of uncertainty. SMRs, often presented as a flexible and potentially cheaper alternative to large conventional reactors, are central to some partnership discussions. Yet critics argue that SMRs remain relatively untested at scale, may carry higher per-kilowatt capital costs, and could complicate maintenance and regulatory oversight. In a system with limited nuclear experience, the trade-off between proven large reactors and emerging SMR designs is not trivial; rushing into fashionable technology without full lifecycle analysis would be a real risk.

The Long Arc of Philippine Nuclear Politics

Marcos’ nuclear initiative sits within a much older pattern in Philippine energy politics. Nuclear power tends to reappear in the national debate whenever governments confront spikes in electricity prices or worries about baseload capacity, only to be slowed by institutional gaps, legal complexity, and public trust deficits. The BNPP saga is the most visible manifestation of that cycle, but it is not the only one; previous administrations have flirted with nuclear roadmaps and feasibility work, only to retreat or stall.

What distinguishes the current phase is the combination of a declared national energy emergency, a presidential narrative tying nuclear to both climate and competitiveness, and the concrete establishment of PhilAtom with a comprehensive safety law passed unanimously in the Senate. That alignment of political signal, legal framework, and international engagement does not guarantee reactors will be built or that they will deliver cheaper electricity. It does, however, indicate that the Philippines is closer than at any point in its history to possessing the institutional infrastructure that a serious nuclear program requires.

What Will Ultimately Decide the Nuclear Future

From an energy-systems perspective, the decisive questions are not whether nuclear is “good” or “bad” in the abstract, but whether, in Philippine conditions, it is the least-cost, most reliable way to deliver firm, low-carbon power over the coming decades. Answering that requires more than speeches and framework laws. It demands integrated resource planning that compares nuclear against aggressive deployment of renewables, gas, storage, and grid modernization; transparent feasibility studies for candidate sites; clear financing structures that detail who bears which risks; and a credible national waste and emergency-preparedness strategy.

Marcos has moved the country decisively into the preparatory phase: a regulator exists, a legal backbone is in place, international partners are engaged, and nuclear is framed as a “strategic pillar” of the energy mix. Whether this phase becomes the long-promised reality of electrons from a Philippine reactor feeding into the grid—or another turn in the cycle of nuclear ambition and deferral—will depend on technical rigor, governance quality, and the administration’s willingness to expose its nuclear choices to independent economic and safety scrutiny.